Abstract. Bergman's ring E p , parameterized by a prime number p, is a ring with p 5 elements that cannot be embedded in a ring of matrices over any commutative ring. This ring was discovered in 1974. In 2011, Climent, Navarro and Tortosa described an efficient implementation of E p using simple modular arithmetic, and suggested that this ring may be a useful source for intractable cryptographic problems. We present a deterministic polynomial time reduction of the discrete logarithm problem in E p to the classical discrete logarithm problem in Z p , the p-element field. In particular, the discrete logarithm problem in E p can be solved, by conventional computers, in sub-exponential time.
Introduction
For discrete logarithm based cryptography, it is desirable to find efficiently implementable groups for which sub-exponential algorithms for the discrete logarithm problem are not available. Thus far, the only candidates for such groups seem to be (carefully chosen) groups of points on elliptic curves [5, 7] . Groups of invertible matrices over a finite field, proposed in [8] , where proved by Menezes and Wu [6] inadequate for this purpose. Consequently, any candidate for a platform group for discrete logarithm based cryptography must not be efficiently embeddable in a group of matrices.
In 1974, Bergman proved that the ring End.Z p Z p 2 / of endomorphisms of the group Z p Z p 2 , where p is a prime parameter, admits no embedding in any ring of matrices over a commutative ring [1] . In 2011, Climent, Navarro and Tortosa [3] described an efficient implementation of E p (reviewed below), proved that uniformly random elements of E p are invertible with probability greater than 1 2=p, and supplied an efficient way to sample the invertible elements of E p uniformly at random. Consequently, they proposed this ring as a potential source for intractable cryptographic problems. Climent et al. proposed a Diffie-Hellman type key exchange protocol over E p , but it was shown by Kamal and Youssef [4] not to be related to the discrete logarithm problem, and to be susceptible to a polynomial time attack.
We consider the discrete logarithm problem in E p . Since E p admits no embedding in any ring of matrices over a commutative ring, the Menezes-Wu reduction attack [6] is not directly applicable. We present, however, a deterministic polynomial time reduction of the discrete logarithm problem in E p to the classical discrete logarithm problem in Z p , the p-element field. In particular, the discrete logarithm problem in E p can be solved by conventional computers in sub-exponential time, and E p offers no advantage, over Z p , for cryptography based on the discrete logarithm problem. Addition (respectively, multiplication) is defined by first taking ordinary addition (respectively, multiplication) over the integers, and then reducing each element of the first row modulo p, and each element of the second row modulo p 2 . The ordinary zero and identity integer matrices are the additive and multiplicative neutral elements of E p , respectively. The element g is invertible in E p if and only if a; v ¤ 0. The group of invertible elements in a ring R is denoted R . For an element g in a group, jgj denotes the order of g in that group. Definition 1. The discrete logarithm problem in a ring R is to find x given an element g 2 R and its power g x , where x 2 ¹0; 1; : : : ; jgj 1º.
Another version of the discrete logarithm problem asks to find any Q x such that g Q x D g x . The reductions given below are applicable, with minor changes, to this version as well, but it is known that the two versions are essentially equivalent (see Appendix B).
By the standard amplification techniques, one can increase the success probability of any discrete logarithm algorithm with non-negligible success probability to become arbitrarily close to 1. Thus, for simplicity, we may restrict attention to
The discrete logarithm problem in Bergman's non-representable ring 173 algorithms that never fail. For ease of digestion, we present our solution to the discrete logarithm problem in E p by starting with the easier cases, and gradually building up. Not all of the easier reductions are needed for the main ones, but they do contain some of the important ingredients of the main ones, and may also be of independent interest to some readers.
Basic reductions
Reduction 2. Computing the order of an element in R , using discrete logarithms in R.
Reduction 3. Computing discrete logarithms in a product of rings using discrete logarithms in each ring separately.
Details. For rings R; S, .R S/ D R S . Let .g; h/ 2 R S and .g; h/ x D .g x ; h x /, where x 2 ¹1; : : : ; j.g; h/jº, be given. Compute
Use Reduction 2 to compute jgj and jhj. Compute, using the Chinese Remainder Algorithm, x mod lcm.jgj; jhj/ D x mod j.g; h/j D x:
The Euler isomorphism is the function
The functionˆp is easily seen to be an injective homomorphism between groups of equal cardinality, and thus an isomorphism of groups (cf. Paillier [9] in a slightly more involved context). The Euler isomorphism can be inverted efficiently: Given
where the inverse is in Z p 2 . Since 1 C ap < p 2 , we can subtract 1 and divide by p to get a.
Reduction 4.
Computing discrete logarithms in Z p 2 using discrete logarithms in Z p .
Details. Use the Euler isomorphism to transform the problem into a computation of a discrete logarithm in .Z p ; C/ .Z p ; /. Computing discrete logarithm in .Z p ; C/ is trivial. Apply Reduction 3.
Algebraic lemmata
Definition 5. N E p is the ring of matrices a b pc v , a; b; c; v 2 ¹0; 1; : : : ; p 1º, where addition and multiplication are carried out over Z, and then entry .2; 1/ is reduced modulo p 2 , and the other three entries are reduced modulo p.
Lemma 6. The map
Proof. Since addition is component-wise, it remains to verify multiplicativity. Indeed, in E p ,
and in N E p ,
cp v 2 N E p , and let x be a natural number. Define d x 2 Z p by
Proof. By induction on x. The statement is immediate when x D 1.
Thus, in either case,
(1) If a D v and at least one of b; c is nonzero, then j N gj D p jaj.
Proof. Define d x as in Lemma 7. By Lemma 7,
Thus, jaj and jvj divide j N gj, and therefore so does lcm.jaj; jvj/. We consider all possible cases.
for all x, and thus j N gj D lcm.jaj; jvj/, as claimed in (2). Assume, henceforth, that at least one of b; c is nonzero, and let l D lcm.jaj; jvj/:
and thus, by Lemma 7, N g l D I . Thus, j N gj divides l, which we have seen to divide
and thus j N gj D p jaj, as claimed in (1).
The main reductions
Reduction 9. Computing discrete logarithms in N E p using discrete logarithms in
cp v 2 N E p , and let x 2 ¹1; : : : ; j N gjº. By Lemma 7,
Since x < j N gj, we can use the Chinese Remainder Algorithm to compute x mod lcm.jaj; jvj/ D x.
Thus, assume that a D v and one of b; c is nonzero. By Lemma 8 
Since b or c is nonzero, we can extract d x x 0 mod p. Compute Compute sq mod p D ..1 C sqp/ 1/=p. In Z p , multiply by s 1 to obtain q mod p D q. Multiply by j N gj to get x x 0 , and add x 0 .
